On Ayer and Sartre’s Philosophical Construct

At the encroachment of Ayers philosophical treatise, he clearly asserted that the absolute direction of concluding the common philosophical disputes and cleavages is to elucidate the purpose of what is being asked, and thence circumstantiate the property of philosophical enquiry through the utilization of synthetical constructs.Ayer defines logical expression as if we heap provide a comment in use showing how to get rid of a marge a in favor of other footing b, c, etc., then we may say that the thing supposedly referred to by a is a logical construction out of the things referred to by b, c, etc. So, for example, tables atomic number 18 logical constructions out of sense-contents (Ayer 3), which means that logical construction necessitates a referent of the object being perceive, thus metaphysical context of use is immaterial. Logical construction is the panacea for providing definitive definition for objects, which is also the net task of philosophy.Logical construction fo r Ayer lays bare the foundation of proving the invalidity of metaphysics because the transcendent humans of such philosophy does not hold any truth at all, for intuition alone cannot suffice in concretizing that knowledge of it was deduced to mans intuition and necessitated him to project the transcendent reality.This is a dismal argument for Ayer because it deems that any philosophical enquiry must start first on what the senses perceive. thereof in order for him to establish an argument that will lead to the extermination of metaphysics, as well as its other precepts such as intentionality, conduct and consciousness, Ayer intersperse logical construction in his treatise Language, Truth and Logic.For even if it is the quality that the definition of a cardinal number as a kin of classes similar to a given class is circular, and it is not possible to center mathematical notions to purely logical notions, it will still remain sure that the propositions of mathematics are analy tic propositions.They will form a supererogatory class of analytic propositions, containing special terms, but they will be none the less analytic for that. For the criterion of an analytic proposition is that its validity should result simply from the definition of the terms contained in it, and this condition is fulfilled by the propositions of pure mathematics.1Ayers counterarguments amount to an attempt to circumvent the intentionality of manner by asylum to dispositions that can be defined as end-states of self-regulating systems.This is a regenerate version of the old physicalist proposal to characterize motives not in terms of an intended meaning but as needs that we measure by organic states. Given this presupposition, we can describe the behavior to be analyze without reference to the motive the motive, which is also represented in observable behavior, can be understood as the initial condition in a lawful hypothesis and identified as the cause of the motivated behavio r.I do not see, however, how the organic states, the needs, or the systemic conditions that represent end-states, thus the motives, are supposed to be describable at all on the level of social action without reference to transmitted meaning.Since, however, the description of motivated behavior itself also implies this meaning, that description cannot be given independently of motive. The proposed distinction betwixt motive for behavior and motivated behavior itself remains problematic.1 Ayer, A.J., Language, Truth and Logic. capital of Delaware Publications, Inc., New York, p. 108.